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Armenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 (July 25, 2013)1 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
Summary 
 The Court considered whether a concession-of-guilt strategy is equivalent to a guilty 
plea, thus requiring the district court to canvass a defendant to determine whether he knowingly 
and voluntarily consented to the concession of guilt. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court concluded that a concession-of-guilt strategy is not equivalent to a guilty plea; 
therefore, the district court had no obligation to canvass the defendant with regard to his 
concession-of-guilt strategy.  Consequently, the Court overruled Hernandez v. State2, which held 
that a concession of guilt is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, on the grounds that the 
rationale behind Hernandez was unsound and inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Florida v. Nixon.3  As such, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Armenta-Carpio was charged with attempted sexual assault of a child under 14 years of 
age, five counts of lewdness with a child under 14 years of age, attempted lewdness with a child 
under 14 years of age, and child abuse and neglect for his reproachable behavior towards his 
young daughter over a five year period.  During opening statement at trial, defense counsel 
conceded that three of the eight incidents charged by the State were consistent with Armenta-
Carpio’s police statement, instead arguing that the State had overcharged the case.  In a hearing 
outside of the jury’s presence, the district court asked Armenta-Carpio about “whether he had 
agreed to counsel’s strategy to conceded guilt as to some conduct while challenging the number 
of incidents alleged by the State,” and he responded that he agreed to the concession-of-guilt 
strategy.4 
 The defense counsel’s tactics failed, and the jury found Armenta-Carpio guilty on all 
counts.  This appeal followed.  
Discussion 
 Justice Parraguirre delivered the unanimous opinion of the court. 
 Relying on Hernandez, Armenta-Carpio argued that the district court inadequately 
canvassed him after he revealed his concession strategy.  In Hernandez, the Court concluded that 
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3  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004). 
4  Armenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 54 at 3 (July 25, 2013). 
a “concession of guilt involves the waiver of a constitutional right that must be voluntary and 
knowing.”5  Furthermore, the Hernandez Court found that the district court must canvass a 
defendant who employs a concession-of-guilt strategy to ensure that the defendant knowingly 
and voluntarily entered into the agreement.6 
 The Court pointed out that Hernandez relied heavily on State v. Perez, which found that a 
concession of guilt was the “functional equivalent” of a guilty plea because it deprives the 
defendant of constitutionally guaranteed rights.7  However, the Supreme Court in Nixon rejected 
the reasoning in Perez, finding that the concession-of-guilt strategy still preserves a defendant’s 
rights to cross-examination, confrontation, and trial by jury.8  Therefore, having now considered 
Hernandez in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon, the Court concluded that a 
concession-of-guilt strategy is fundamentally different from a guilty plea.  Thus, the district court 
need not canvass a defendant because there is no waiver of constitutional rights that must be 
made knowingly and voluntarily. 
 In its conclusion, the Court stated that, in the instant case, its departure from stare decisis 
was justified for two reasons.  First, the Hernandez ruling that established district court 
procedures to address concession-of-guilt strategies went beyond the limited question before the 
Hernandez court, and was thus dicta.  Second, Hernandez was clearly at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Nixon. 
Conclusion 
 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Nixon, the Court found that a concession-
of-guilt strategy was different than an admission of guilt, and thus did not require the district 
court to canvass a defendant about the waiver of constitutional rights.  By this finding, the Court 
overruled Hernandez and affirmed the Eighth Judicial District Court’s decision. 
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